A conclusory allegation is a statement that names a legal conclusion or an element of a claim without the facts behind it. "Defendant discriminated against me" is conclusory. "On May 3, my supervisor gave my accounts to a younger colleague and wrote 'fresh energy' on the transfer form" is factual. A court disregards conclusory allegations on a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6).
The two-step test in one paragraph
This post covers step one of the federal plausibility analysis: finding the allegations a court will not credit. The full standard, its history and how state courts differ sit in our motion to dismiss guide. The short version: Ashcroft v. Iqbal says a court "can choose to begin by identifying pleadings that, because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009). It then takes the well-pleaded facts that remain and asks whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief. Step one decides what goes into that pile.
The Court's sorting rule fits in one sentence: "Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice." Id. at 678. And from the earlier case: a plaintiff's obligation "requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do." Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007).
Two points older articles get wrong:
- There is no notice-pleading carve-out. Iqbal holds that Twombly "expounded the pleading standard for 'all civil actions,'" and that it applies "to antitrust and discrimination suits alike." 556 U.S. at 684. Rule 84 and the Appendix of Forms, which once modeled bare-bones complaints, were abrogated effective December 1, 2015. The committee note says the abrogation did not change pleading standards.
- Conclusory does not mean short. Rule 8(a)(2) still requires only "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief," and Rule 8(d)(1) asks that each allegation be "simple, concise, and direct." A one-sentence factual allegation passes. A page of adjectives does not.
Conclusory vs. factual allegations: the test to apply
Ask of each sentence: could the defendant respond to it with a date, a document, a name or a number? If the only possible response is "denied," it is probably a conclusion.
| Usually conclusory | Usually factual |
|---|---|
| Labels: "willful," "unlawful," "discriminatory," "bad faith" | What was said, written or done, and by whom |
| The element restated: "Defendant owed and breached a duty" | The relationship that created the duty and the act that fell short |
| Collective pleading: "Defendants conspired" | Which defendant did what, with whom, on what date |
| Unexplained inference: "Defendant knew" | The notice the defendant received: the letter, call or report |
| Bare mental state: "acted with intent" | Conduct from which intent can be inferred |
The right-hand column is not a guarantee. A fact can be pleaded and still fail the second step if it is merely consistent with liability. But a complaint made only of left-hand sentences gives the court nothing to weigh.
Rewriting conclusory allegations: five claims
Rows 3 and 4 adapt the conclusory language of the complaints in Iqbal and Twombly. The factual versions are hypotheticals we wrote to show the technique, not facts from any case. Check the elements under your jurisdiction's law.
| Claim | Conclusory version | Factual version (hypothetical) | Why it passes |
|---|---|---|---|
| Breach of contract | "Defendant breached the parties' agreement, causing Plaintiff damages." | "On January 10, 2026, the parties signed a supply agreement requiring Defendant to deliver 500 units by March 1. Defendant delivered 220 and has delivered none since. Plaintiff bought replacements at $14 more per unit." | Identifies the contract, the promised act, the missed performance and the loss. |
| Employment discrimination | "Plaintiff was terminated because of his age and national origin." | "I am 47 and was born in Portugal. On April 8, 2026, my supervisor removed me from the Lisbon accounts and gave them to a 29-year-old hired in 2025. He fired me on June 2, saying the role needed 'fresh energy.'" | Dates, ages, an identified decision-maker and the words used. |
| Section 1983, supervisory liability | "Defendants knew of, condoned, and agreed to the unlawful treatment." | "On June 6 I gave Warden Reyes a written grievance describing the beatings. On June 9 she signed Order 14, which kept the unit on lockdown with no staff review. The beatings continued on June 12 and 15." | Ties this defendant's own acts to the harm, which supervisory liability requires. |
| Antitrust conspiracy | "Defendants agreed not to compete and allocated markets among themselves." | "On September 14, 2025, executives of Defendants A and B attended a trade-association dinner. Within 30 days both withdrew from the other's territory. A's regional vice president wrote to a colleague that B 'had agreed to stay on their side.'" | Adds facts suggesting a preceding agreement, beyond identical conduct. |
| Fraud | "Defendant made false statements to induce Plaintiff's investment." | "On March 3, 2026, in an email to me, Defendant's CFO stated the company had $4.2 million in signed contracts. At that date the company had signed two contracts worth $1.1 million. I wired $250,000 on March 9." | Who, what, when and how it was false, which Rule 9(b) demands. |
Employment discrimination: the Swierkiewicz wrinkle
A plaintiff does not have to plead a McDonnell Douglas prima facie case. Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 510 (2002), holds that the prima facie case "is an evidentiary standard, not a pleading requirement." Twombly left that holding in place, describing Swierkiewicz as a reversal of a "heightened pleading requirement" and adding: "we do not require heightened fact pleading of specifics, but only enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." 550 U.S. at 570. The Swierkiewicz complaint was enough because it "detailed the events leading to his termination, provided relevant dates, and included the ages and nationalities of at least some of the relevant persons involved with his termination." 534 U.S. at 514.
So the row above is not a prima facie case in a pleading. It is a plain account of what happened, and that is what survived there.
Section 1983 and Bivens: Iqbal's own facts
The Iqbal complaint, a Bivens suit against federal officials, alleged that Ashcroft was the "principal architect" of a discriminatory detention policy and that Mueller was "instrumental" in adopting and executing it, and that petitioners "knew of, condoned, and willfully and maliciously agreed to subject [him]" to harsh conditions of confinement. The Court held that these "bare assertions, much like the pleading of conspiracy in Twombly, amount to nothing more than a 'formulaic recitation of the elements' of a constitutional discrimination claim." 556 U.S. at 680-81.
The reason supervisory claims are fragile is the rule behind the row: "Because vicarious liability is inapplicable to Bivens and § 1983 suits, a plaintiff must plead that each Government-official defendant, through the official's own individual actions, has violated the Constitution." Id. at 676. Allegations about a title, or about what a supervisor "must have known," do not meet it. Allegations about what the supervisor received and did can.
Antitrust: Twombly's own facts
The Twombly complaint alleged "upon information and belief" that the defendant carriers "have entered into a contract, combination or conspiracy to prevent competitive entry" and "agreed not to compete with one another." 550 U.S. at 551. The Court held that "a conclusory allegation of agreement at some unidentified point does not supply facts adequate to show illegality," and that parallel conduct must be "placed in a context that raises a suggestion of a preceding agreement." Id. at 557. The fix is context: meetings, communications, statements, conduct that makes no sense absent an agreement.
Fraud: a different standard
Rule 9(b) sits on top of Rule 8: "a party must state with particularity the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake." The same rule lets "malice, intent, knowledge, and other conditions of a person's mind" be "alleged generally." Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b). The circumstances (the statement, the speaker, the date, the reason it was false) must be specific; the relaxed rule for mental state does not reach them.
"On information and belief"
Pleading on information and belief is allowed when the facts are in the other side's hands. It is a statement about the source of your knowledge, not about the quality of the allegation. The Twombly complaint used the phrase and lost, because the facts under it described only parallel conduct.
Two practical points:
- State the facts that lead you to the belief. "On information and belief, Defendant knew" is conclusory. "A former employee told me Defendant's compliance director reviewed the report on June 2" gives the court something to credit.
- Rule 11 still applies. Under Rule 11(b)(3), factual contentions must "have evidentiary support or, if specifically so identified, will likely have evidentiary support after a reasonable opportunity for further investigation or discovery." The qualifier works only if you identify the allegation as one that depends on investigation. See our guide to Rule 11 sanctions.
How courts read pro se complaints
Erickson v. Pardus is often misread as a carve-out. A prisoner alleged that a doctor removed him from hepatitis C treatment, that the treatment program he had started was meant to last a year, and that officials refused to continue it. The court of appeals held that he had made "only conclusory allegations" of harm. The Supreme Court said that was error: "Specific facts are not necessary; the statement need only 'give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.'" Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007) (per curiam). And: "A document filed pro se is 'to be liberally construed.'" Id. at 94.
Read that as a rule about interpretation. The court reads your words generously. It does not supply facts you left out. A pro se complaint that says "the landlord violated my rights" still leaves the court with nothing to credit. One that says what the landlord did, on what date, and what it cost has done the work Iqbal asks for, in plain language.
After a "conclusory" dismissal: an amendment checklist
- Read the order for the specific allegations the court named. Courts often identify them paragraph by paragraph. Those are your rewrite list.
- Check the deadline and whether you need permission. Rule 15(a)(1) allows one amendment as a matter of course within 21 days after service of a Rule 12(b) motion. After that, Rule 15(a)(2) requires the opposing party's written consent or the court's leave, which "the court should freely give . . . when justice so requires." Many dismissals set their own deadline. Follow it.
- Sort each flagged allegation into three piles: facts you have and can add, facts you can get through a records request or public source, and allegations you cannot support. Drop the third pile. Rule 11 applies to the amended pleading too.
- Rewrite with the table's discipline. Names, dates, places, amounts, documents. Plead against each element so the court can see it.
- Verify every case in the amended complaint and brief. Confirm the authority exists, the pin cite is right, and it has not been overruled. Our guides on finding controlling authority and checking whether a case is still good law cover that step.
Defending instead? Answering the complaint and pleading affirmative defenses come after the Rule 12 motion is decided, and opposing one starts with responding to a motion to dismiss.
Frequently asked questions
What is a conclusory allegation?
A conclusory allegation states a legal conclusion, or restates an element of a claim, without the facts that would make it true. 'Defendant breached the contract' is conclusory. 'Defendant did not deliver the 500 units due on March 1' is factual. Courts set conclusory allegations aside when deciding a motion to dismiss.
Can a complaint be dismissed for conclusory allegations?
Yes. Under Rule 12(b)(6), a court disregards conclusory statements and asks whether the remaining facts plausibly show a right to relief. If they do not, the claim is dismissed. Dismissal is often without prejudice, and a plaintiff can usually seek leave to amend with specific facts.
Is 'on information and belief' a conclusory allegation?
Not automatically. The phrase signals that the pleader lacks firsthand knowledge, and it is allowed. But it does not turn a conclusion into a fact. The Twombly complaint alleged a conspiracy 'upon information and belief' and was still dismissed because the facts offered showed only parallel conduct.
Do courts hold pro se complaints to the same standard?
Courts read pro se filings liberally, and Erickson v. Pardus says they are held to less stringent standards than lawyer-drafted pleadings. That is a rule about how to read what you wrote. It does not excuse leaving out the basic facts of who did what, when, and how you were harmed.
What should I do if my complaint was dismissed as conclusory?
Read the order for the specific allegations the court called conclusory, then check the deadline to amend and whether leave is needed. Rewrite each flagged allegation with names, dates, places and amounts, and drop any claim you cannot support with facts. File the amended complaint within the time the court allowed.
Check the authority behind each element
A rewritten complaint or a brief opposing dismissal leans on cases for every element. Before you file, run the draft through the Hallucination Shield: free, no signup, up to 50 citations per run, each flagged if CaseRead cannot verify it. It does not judge whether you described a holding correctly, so read the opinions you cite. CaseRead's citing-case screen also scans the opinions that cite each case and flags possible negative treatment. It is a lead, not a citator, so confirm treatment before you rely on a case.
This article is for general information and is not legal advice. For guidance on a specific case, consult a licensed attorney in your jurisdiction.